Various new rules are being discussed to reform the international tax architecture. This essay will argue that despite the unfairness of the new rules, Singapore will be able to comply with these rules while maintaining their economic success. To provide context for what will follow, the nature of tax competition will be discussed first. Some authors argue that it is unethical and lead to an inefficient allocation of resources globally. Others argue that tax incentives are ineffective in attracting FDI. The debate is inconclusive. However, Singapore’s case shows how they have successfully utilised their tax policy along with other policy to propel their economy. Singapore’s Income Tax Act will be explained to show how it operates to incentivise businesses. Next, some of the major rules to redesign the international tax architecture that are being discussed to reflect the changes in the digitalisation of the economy will be looked at. Namely, (1) the appropriateness of moving towards consumer-based taxing; (2) Pillar One and the re-allocation of profits; (3) Pillar Two and the global minimum tax of 15%. The evaluation of these rules will show why they are unfair, especially for small countries. Despite this, it is argued that Singapore’s attractive business environment will help maintain their success as a strong economy.
Table of Content
1. The Nature of Tax Competition
In a capitalist economy, businesses prioritise shareholder value and aim to maximise profits for shareholders. However, even if businesses streamline operations and reduce their costs, they face an additional hurdle at the bottom line. This is the corporate tax. To reduce the tax payable, businesses relocate in countries where the tax rates are lower. The countries that receive this influx of investment also benefit. So, they keep their tax rates low to attract more businesses. In this way, tax competition arises when countries compete with each other in a non-cooperative way by reducing tax rates to attract businesses to relocate.[1]
Most studies on the effectiveness of tax incentives are inconclusive. This is because different methods and regions are considered for different studies.[2] However, the consensus is that an attractive investment climate that is provided along with tax incentives are sure to attract Multinational Enterprises (‘MNEs’).[3] Singapore has used both to reach the position they are today.
There are two main strands of literature about tax competition. The first argument states that there is little evidence to show that tax incentives are effective in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (‘FDI’).[4] This is especially the case in developing countries.[5] Instead, other factors such as the development of the political and legal system along with infrastructure play a larger role in luring FDI.[6] Singapore has developed these other factors in addition to offering tax incentives. Nevertheless, the significance of tax incentives cannot be ignored. Singapore is a country that has successfully utilised tax incentives to propel their economy.[7]
The opposing argument is that FDI is sensitive to tax incentives. However, they are divided as to whether using such measures to attract FDI is ethical or not. Some argue that if substantial economic activity is undertaken, companies should be free to relocate to low tax jurisdictions.[8] In contrast, others believe that using low tax rates to attract FDI is unethical ultimately leads to a global loss due to inefficient allocation of resources.[9] Furthermore, tax competition may result in a ‘race to the bottom’, where countries continuously reduce tax rates until they approach zero.[10]
The severe impact of harmful tax competition on the global economy can be seen through MNEs who have often abused the gaps within the law to pay minimal taxes.[11] A report that studied the Fortune 500 companies between 2009 – 2012 showed that 288 out of the 500 companies were profitable during this period.[12] However, among these, 111 companies paid zero taxes or less.[13] In order to reduce such gaps the OECD has been at the forefront in changing the international tax architecture.
The OECD launched the BEPS project in 2013.[14] They presented 15 action plans.[15] The original BEPS aim was to make sure taxation is collected at the source.[16] This was to ensure profits are taxed in the country in which economic activities are performed and where value is created.[17] However, the OECD argues that the original rules are inadequate to address business models beyond the traditional brick-and-mortar companies. In 2019 bold changes have been presented under the name of the “Two-Pillar Approach”.[18] Pillar One allocates taxing rights between different jurisdictions.[19] Pillar Two introduces Global Anti-Base Erosion (‘GLoBE’).
In the next section the current Singaporean corporate tax framework will be explained to provide some context for the analysis that will follow.
2. Taxation in Singapore
Singapore is a small country with few natural resources. Their economic success can be attributed to their economic policies.[20] Tax incentives have been offered as early as 1967 to attract FDI to stimulate the economy and create more jobs.[21] This was during a time when the country had unskilled labour and a poor business environment in addition to their existing lack of natural resources.[22] Due to their small population, they also have much lower consumption. Therefore, it required strong incentives such as low tax rates to convince businesses to locate there.[23]
Singapore offers tax incentives for a range of industries. Targeted incentives are administered by the Economic Development Board (‘EDB’) which is a part of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The EDB’s aim is to develop “high-value and substantive economic activities in Singapore”.[24] The incentives fall within three main categories:
- growing industries;
- innovation, R&D and capacity development;
- productivity.[25]
Singapore’s headline tax rate is 17%.[26] The most notable investment incentive is the pioneer status which grants tax exemption for 5 to 15 years.[27] Additionally, a development incentive is given for post-pioneer companies whereby profits are taxed from 5% up to 20 years.[28] Nevertheless, Singapore has always remained compliant with international tax rules. The OECD report in 2015 showed that the tax incentives offered by Singapore were not harmful and those which were harmful were then abolished or amended.[29]
It is noteworthy that these incentives are targeted towards companies that have real economic activity. Moreover, companies that are awarded the pioneer and post-pioneer status will add additional external benefits to the economy as well.
The Singapore Income Tax Act 1947 stipulates that resident companies are subject to tax on any income accruing in or derived from Singapore or received in Singapore from outside Singapore. Therefore, foreign income is taxed only when it is received in Singapore. Moreover, even once foreign income is remitted, it may be exempt if it satisfies the following conditions;
- the headline tax rate of the foreign jurisdiction from which the income is received should be at least 15% at the time the foreign income is received in Singapore;
- the foreign income was subjected to tax in the foreign jurisdiction from which it was received; and
- IRAS is satisfied that the exemption would be beneficial to the Singapore resident.[30]
This system is described as the territorial plus remittance system.[31] They adopt this system because they want to promote a fiscal environment where investment and economic growth is encouraged.[32]
This attracts companies to setup headquarters in Singapore as their overall tax burden can be maintained lower.[33] On the other hand, countries that tax residents on a worldwide tax system are in a less advantageous position whereby the MNEs would face worldwide tax consequences.[34]
The size of the economy is one major reason why Singapore can benefit so significantly from its tax policies. The net gain to smaller countries by offering tax incentives is much higher than larger countries.[35] The tax revenue of a country is determined by multiplying the tax rate and the tax base. The relative sensitivity of the tax base determines the revenue outcome. If a country reduces its tax rate and collects less tax revenue as a result, it is referred to as the tax rate effect.[36] If a country reduces its tax rates but the inflow of capital which enlarges the tax base compensates for the reduction in the rate and results in a higher total revenue, it is referred to as the tax base effect.[37] For small countries, the tax base effect is more significant.[38] This means that when Singapore reduces its tax rates, it results in a more than proportionate increase in FDI inflow. As a result, the total tax revenue for the country increases. Hence, tax is a stronger tool for Singapore in comparison to other larger countries.
Another benefit of the territorial plus remittance system to residents is that they are encouraged to invest abroad as well. This is because residents know that the income earned on foreign investments will not be taxed in Singapore unless remitted. Moreover, even if it is remitted, most active income and dividends are likely to be exempt and so the country benefits as residents repatriate earnings back to the country instead of parking it offshore.[39] However, this does not apply to passive income such as interest and royalty.[40]
In summary, the Singaporean tax system is designed to encourage investment and stimulate economic activity. However, some of the proposed changes will take away the competitive edge that is offered.
3. Proposed Changes
The biggest issue in international taxation currently lies in the problem that companies use various structures to avoid paying taxes in the countries where they actually operate. There are various reasons that have enabled these MNEs to operate this way.[41] The new rules envisioned by the OECD aims to put a halt to this. The three main types of reforms that are debated include the idea of moving towards consumer taxation by widening the scope of what amounts to a permanent establishment (‘PE’) along with Pillars One and Two. Some of the ideas within these three overlaps. However, it is worthwhile discussing whether these proposed changes are truly fair. This section will explain how Singapore will lose out because of these changes.
3.1 Consumer taxation
In the current international tax regime, preference is given to source-based taxation.[42] This means that the countries that host these MNEs have priority to tax economic activity and the value that is created in that jurisdiction regardless of the residency of the taxpayer.[43] Traditionally, governments exert taxing right over another jurisdiction through the establishment of a PE. Currently, the location of the customer nor where consumption takes place form any basis for an income tax claim.[44] The income tax does not follow the destination principle.
However, the changes proposed relinquishes the priority that is given to source-countries by apportioning a part or all of the profit to the market jurisdiction i.e., where the consumer is located. The proponents of change argue that the global business model has changed to the extent that significant value is added by the consumer now and that it should result in a PE in the market jurisdiction. The argument is that even though some of these activities were merely auxiliary in nature, it now forms part and parcel of the main service and should be enough to form a PE, thereby widening the definition of a PE.[45]
However, the extent to which consumers add value to these products is questionable. For countries such as Singapore where the population is small, moving towards consumer taxes are sure to be detrimental.
3.1.1 The digital business model
To understand the argument for consumer taxation, it is vital to understand how the new digital business model works. In the age of the internet, many large technology companies collect vast amounts of data from individuals through their devices.[46] For example, data is obtained when customers use social media or search-based functions on the internet. Next, based on this data, the needs and wants of demographics are identified using algorithms to feed advertisements and sell products to consumers. This is how companies such as Google make money from third-party companies who advertise on their platforms. Google’s ability to deliver accurate results will improve along with the data they collect. Hence, users are arguably the ones that primarily add value to companies such as Google through their data input.
Simply, the argument is that if the user data is an economic input which can be processed and sold, it should be recognised as part of the value.[47] The problem is that user value in this way is not accounted for in the current international tax framework.[48] To fix this, one extreme proposal is to completely push corporate taxes to consumer states. So, some governments now assert that where consumption takes place is where the valuable data input is generated.[49] These countries have started implementing user-based turnover taxes in relation to digitalised industries.[50]
This is the view put forward in the case of South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc in the United States Supreme Court in 2018.[51] It was decided that a company can collect sales tax from the consumer from the jurisdiction the consumer is located, even if the seller has no physical presence there.[52] The opinion explains an example where a website that is accessible in South Dakota can be said to have a physical presence in another state via customers’ computers.[53] It was further stated that wherever the user is browsing from could form the basis for a location specific PE.[54] A similar finding is presented by India’s Authority for Advance Rulings that a foreign company’s server establishes a PE for tax purposes.[55] Furthermore, including consumer devices that connects to these servers to also form a PE is an extension of the same concept.[56] If such a wide scope is accepted, a PE could arise too easily.
For corporate taxes, such a change will be unacceptable as it excludes all the value that is created by such businesses. Without the algorithm developed by companies to process this data, there will be no service of value. Admittedly, without the user data there is nothing to process. However, data has been collected by businesses for decades through other less automated measures such as surveys. These surveys hold low value until a business produces a product to meet the demands that was identified in the data. Hence, the value of the user data is grossly overvalued.
Moreover, technology and other innovative companies take significant risks as they often try to reinvent the wheel. As a result, a lot of these companies cluster and set up in places where they benefit from external economies of scale. Over the past few decades, Singapore has attracted many technology businesses by offering tax incentives. If corporate taxes arise where the consumer is, companies will have less reason to operate in countries like Singapore as they will ultimately be subject to high taxes where the consumer is.
Additionally, not all companies in the world are digital companies. If the rules were changed it will unfairly affect other businesses. However, ring fencing the rules in a way that it only affects digital companies will both disincentivise the development of new technology and encourage businesses to falsely reclassify themselves as not being technology companies. Therefore, the reduction in external benefits and the administrative cost of this is yet another major disadvantage that Singapore will face.
Hence, it does not make economic sense to widen the definition of the PE to the extent that a business is susceptible to taxes in the market jurisdiction so easily. When the business develops the code and the service in a country, economic value is created in that country. A PE should not arise just because customers use a service from another jurisdiction remotely.
3.2 Pillar One and Pillar Two
The aim of Pillar One is to update the current international tax rules so that businesses in the digital economy can be adequately taxed. It does this by offering market jurisdictions taxing rights over MNEs even though there might be no physical presence.[57] 25% of the residual profits of the largest MNEs are to be reallocated to the market jurisdiction where its customers are located. Currently, this applies to MNEs that earn a profit margin higher than 10% and a turnover greater than €20 billion. Unlike the analysis above, Pillar One does not seek to establish a PE in the market jurisdiction. However, it is seeking to reallocate 25% of profits which is the amount the OECD has put forward to be the rightful value to be reallocated to the market jurisdiction for the value created by users. However, even 25% is too much.
Pillar Two aims to establish a global minimum tax of 15%. This minimum tax reduces the incentive for businesses to engage in profit shifting.[58] The GLoBE rules apply to businesses with an annual revenue greater than €750 million.[59] It includes further subrules to ensure its implementation. Firstly, under the income inclusion rule (‘IIR’) the headquartering country will tax the income of a foreign branch if the income was taxed below 15% at the host country.[60] As a backstop to the IIR, the OECD has designed the undertaxed payment rule. It denies a deduction or imposes a source-based taxation for a payment to a related party if that payment was not subject to tax at the minimum rate.[61] Thus, one way or another, the MNE will be subject to tax at 15%.
For many, it is disconcerting that MNEs selling services within a country do not pay taxes, while local businesses do.[62] However, what they fail to understand is that money is not actually made where the users are; money is actually made where the business carries out the work.[63] It is understandable when the layman makes this point and politicians support their rhetoric. However, it is more concerning when tax experts make the same claim while knowing that value is created in the source jurisdiction. Both pillars directly contravene the notion of source-based taxing rights. This is one of its biggest flaws, and the biggest reason why such policies would adversely affect small countries such as Singapore.
Singapore has used their tax incentives to attract various businesses that conduct substantial activities in the jurisdiction, often targeting innovative companies that invest significantly in R&D. As a country with a small population, they are more likely to gain revenue through exports rather than selling within their country. There is no reason why the consumer state should be given a share of any profit for the value that is created by these Singaporean companies. Yet, due to Pillar One, any company that fits the criteria will be forced to reallocate some of their profits to market jurisdictions. The OECD states that the implementation of Pillar One rules will transfer taxing rights on more than US$125 billion of profit to market jurisdictions.[64] This comes at the cost of smaller hub economies like Singapore.[65]
Moreover, Pillar Two contravenes the original BEPS mandate. The original aim of the OECD and the G20 was to halt practices that artificially segregated the taxable income from actual activity. Low or no tax was not considered an issue as long as there was substantial economic activity. As Singapore incentivises companies with real economic activity, it adheres to the original BEPS mandate. However, the minimum tax of 15% under Pillar Two contradicts this initial stance.[66] Substance based carve-outs have been put in place in the new rules to mitigate the loss such countries will initially face. Nevertheless, these carve-outs are unlikely to be significant enough to compensate for losses that will arise.[67]
3.2.1 Sovereignty
Every country has the autonomy to draft policies in ways that best serve their interests. In the race to development, the starting line was not the same for all countries. The playing field has been uneven from the very beginning. While some countries are blessed with vast amounts of natural resources, others are not so lucky. Small countries with low natural resources have far fewer tools to boost economic growth. Nevertheless, when they use low tax rates many are quick to call it unfair. However, most countries operate in open capitalistic economies where competition is encouraged. Different countries use different policies to gain a competitive edge to foster economic development. In a similar vein, Singapore using low tax rates for their economic benefit cannot be described as unfair.[68]
As Singapore is a small country, they are naturally placed in a position to set low tax rates to benefit from the tax base effect.[69] Pillar Two will reduce the effectiveness of the tax incentives offered by Singapore to large MNEs.[70] If Singapore levies an effective tax rate of 10% on an MNE, its home jurisdiction will tax an additional 5% on the company to bring the overall burden up to 15%. Hence, any advantage Singapore offers will be lost.
Taking away this right is an encroachment of their sovereignty.[71] As a result, one of the strongest fiscal tools available for Singapore is snatched away. The beneficiaries will inevitably be capital exporting countries with high tax rates such as the OECD countries.[72]
5. Singapore Survives
Despite all these changes that reduce the effectiveness of Singaporean tax policies, their leaders remain compliant. The Minister for Finance has stated that Singapore will adjust its corporate tax system in line with the Two Pillar solution proposed.[73] He said that Singapore aims to abide by internationally agreed standards, safeguard their taxing rights, and minimise the compliance burden for businesses.[74]
It is expected that a majority of MNE groups in Singapore will have an effective tax rate below 15% and so, will be subject to the minimum tax.[75] There are currently around 1800 companies that meet the €750 million revenue criteria.[76] However, the global effective tax rates will increase along with these rules.[77] Therefore, businesses that meet the criteria may have less incentive to relocate elsewhere as regardless of the location, 15% will be the new floor. Furthermore, other than the extractive and regulated financial services industries, Pillar One is likely to affect only a handful of Singapore headquartered MNEs.[78]
Finally, Singapore ranks 2nd place globally on the ease of doing business index.[79] They have implemented other economic policies in tandem with their tax policy. Singapore has focused on building a strong infrastructure, a stable political system, a strong legal system and skilled work force. All these factors and the tax incentives offered was what enabled Singapore to develop so rapidly. Now, even if the tax incentives are taken away, the companies that have set up are likely to continue operations in Singapore because of all these other factors and the existing sunk cost.
In conclusion, there is no doubt that the redesign of the international tax architecture favours capital exporting countries with high tax rates and countries with large populations. This is at the expense of small countries who often must resort to tax incentives to attract FDI for economic development. The success of Singapore as one of the strongest nations in Asia could be attributed to their economic policies. Being ahead of the curve and offering tax incentives as far back as the 1960s, they are now in a strong and stable position in the global market. Hence, they are able to weather out the negative effects of these changes. Nonetheless, Singapore’s compliance does not mean that the new rules are fair. Other small countries with few natural resources that do not have the head start afforded to Singapore will no longer have this tool to stimulate their economies in the same way. If these rules were put in place a few decades ago, it is unlikely that Singapore would have been able to achieve their global success. Additionally, despite their willingness to cooperate, Singapore should also have the sovereign right to continue using low taxes to retain their position. The rules cannot be reshuffled every time it does not work for a particular group of countries.
References
[1] John Douglas Wilson and David Wildasin, ‘Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon’ (2004) 88 Journal of Public Economics 1065, 1066.
[2] Irma Mosquera Valderrama and Mirka Balharová, ‘Tax Incentives in Developing Countries: A Case Study—Singapore and Philippines’ in Irma Mosquera Valderrama Dries Lesage and Wouter Lips (ed) Taxation, International Cooperation and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (Springer, 2021) 144.
[3] Ibid.
[4] See Howell H Zee, Janet G Stotsky and Eduardo Ley, ‘Tax Incentives for Business Investment: A Primer for Policy Makers in Developing Countries’, (2002) 30(9) World Development 1497.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Valderrama and Balharová (n 2) 121.
[8] See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Harmful Tax Competition – An Emerging Global Issue (Report, 1999) (‘OECD’); Orzil Mazur, ‘Transfer Pricing Challenges in the Cloud’ (2016) 57(2) Boston College Law Review 679 in Bruno da Silva, ‘Taxing Digital Economy: A Critical View Around the GLoBE (Pillar Two)’ (2020) 15(2) Frontiers of Law in China 111, 118 (‘Silva’).
[9] See Paul A Samuelson, ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’ (1954) 36(4) The Review of Economics and Statistics 387, 387-388; Peter Dietsch, Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax Competition (Oxford University Press, 1st ed, 2015) (‘Dietsch’).
[10] Richard Teather, The Benefits of Tax Competition (The Institute of Economic Affairs, 2005) 41.
[11] See Dietsch (n 9).
[12] Robert S McIntyre et al, The Sorry State of Corporate Taxes: What Fortune 500 Firms Pay (or Don’t Pay) In the USA and What They Pay Abroad – 2008 to 2012 (Report, Citizens for Tax Justice and the Institute on Taxation and Public Policy, Washington D.C 2014) <https://ctj.sfo2.digitaloceanspaces.com/2017/11/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf> discussed in Dietsch (n 9) 4
[13] Ibid.
[14] OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Report, 2013).
[15] Ibid.
[16] OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Report, 2013) 10; Lilian V Faulhaber, ‘Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation’ (2019) 39(2) Virginia Tax Review 150.
[17] OECD, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Explanatory Statement, 2015) 4.
[18] OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Statement on a two-pillar solution to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy (Statement, 8 October 2021) OECD 1.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See H C Tang, P Liu & E C Cheung, ‘Changing impact of fiscal policy on selected ASEAN countries’(2013)24 Journal of Asian Economics 103-116.
[21] Stephen Phua Lye Huat and Andrew Halkyard, ‘The impact of tax incentives on economic development in Singapore and Hong Kong’ in Nolan Sharkey (ed) Taxation in ASEAN and China: Local institutions, regionalism, global systems and economic development (Routledge, 1st edn, 2015) 457.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] EDB Singapore, Incentives and Schemes (online at 24th January 2022) <https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/how-we-help/incentives-and-schemes.html>.
[25] Ibid.
[26] N Lingbawan, Singapore – Corporate Taxation, Country Tax Guides IBFD (Country Tax Guide, 15th October 2021) 5
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] OECD, Harmful tax practices – 2017 progress report on preferential regimes: Inclusive framework on BEPS: Action 5 (Report, 2017).
[30] Income Tax Act, Singapore, 1947,s13(9).
[31] W.H. See, ‘The Territoriality Principle in the World of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Initiative: The Cases of Hong Kong and Singapore – Part I’ (2017) 73(1) Bulletin for International Taxation 43, 56.
[32] Phua Lye Huat and Halkyard (n 21) 22.
[33] See (n 31) 55.
[34] See (n 31) 55.
[35] Sam Bucovetsky, ‘Asymmetric Tax Competition’ (1991) 30(2) Journal of Urban Economics 167, 179; Dietsch (n 9) 56.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] See (n 31) 56.
[40] Singapore Ministry for Finance (MOF), Budget Statement 2003: Seizing Opportunities in Uncertainty (Online at 2003) 24-25 <https://www.mof.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/singapore-budget/budget-archives/2003/fy2003_budget_speech.pdf?sfvrsn=c0bb3770_2>.
[41] See, eg, Silva (n 8); Dietsch (n 9).
[42] Sebastian Beer and Geerten Michielse, ‘Strengthening Source-Based Taxation’ in Ruud de Mooij, Alexander Klemm and Victoria (eds), Corporate Income Taxes Under Pressure: Why Reform is Needed and How it Could be Designed (International Monetary Fund, 2021) 227, 229.
[43] Ibid 231.
[44] Nolan Sharkey, ‘The Interests of Developing Countries in the Context of the OECD/G20 Led International Income Tax Initiative’, (2019) 3(2) Bratislava Law Review 47, 53.
[45] Aqib Aslam and Alpa Shah, ‘Taxing the Digital Economy’ in Ruud de Mooij, Alexander Klemm and Victoria (eds), Corporate Income Taxes Under Pressure: Why Reform is Needed and How it Could be Designed (International Monetary Fund, 2021) 189, 189.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid 190.
[48] Ibid 189.
[49] Ibid 201
[50] Ibid 190
[51] 585 U. S. ____ (2018), Supreme Court of the United States. <https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-494_j4el.pdf>.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Aslam and Shah (n 45) 206.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy (Report, October 2021) 14.
[58] OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Statement on a two-pillar solution to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy (Statement, 8 October 2021) 2.
[59] OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy (Report, October 2021) 8.
[60] OECD, Public Consultation Document: Global Anti-Base Erosion (“Globe”) – Pillar two (Report, December 2019).
[61] Ibid.
[62] Nolan Sharkey, ‘Taxing at the source is fair in law, so why not in practice?’ The Conversation (Online at 31st August 2015).
[63] Ibid.
[65] Lawrence Wong, Singapore Minister for Finance, ‘Implications on Singapore from G7 Agreement on Global Minimum Corporate Tax Rate’, Parliamentary replies (Online at 5th July 2021) <https://www.mof.gov.sg/news-publications/parliamentary-replies/implications-on-singapore-from-g7-agreement-on-global-minimum-corporate-tax-rate> (‘Wong’).
[66] Silva (n 8) 118.
[67] Chester Wee, ‘Why there is a silver lining in BEPS 2.0 for Singapore’ EY (Online at 31st July 2021) <https://www.ey.com/en_sg/tax/why-there-is-a-silver-lining-in-beps-2-0-for-singapore> (‘Wee’).
[68] See generally Nolan Sharkey, ‘Taxing at the source is fair in law, so why not in practice?’ The Conversation (Online at 31st August 2015) <Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.>.
[69] Sam Bucovetsky, ‘Asymmetric Tax Competition’ (1991) 30(2) Journal of Urban Economics 167, 179; Dietsch (n 9) 56.
[70] Wong (n 65).
[71] David Rosenbloom, ‘Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Tax Area’ [1994] 20 Canada-United States Law Journal, 267.
[72] Tove Maria Ryding, Who is really at the table when global tax rules get decided? (Briefing Paper, European Network on Debt and Development, October 2021) 3.
[73] Wong (n 65).
[74] Ibid.
[75] Wong (n 65).
[76] Ibid.
[77] Wee (n 67).
[78] Ibid.
[79] The World Bank, ‘Ease of Doing Business Ranking’ (Online, 2020) <https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/singapore>.
